In early April 2025, Pakistan and Afghanistan engaged in a third round of informal negotiations in Urumqi, Xinjiang, following diplomatic efforts in Doha and Istanbul and a Saudi-led initiative. These talks, mediated by China, aimed to alleviate serious border tensions and signalled a renewed commitment to regional stability. The Talks came at a time when both countries have faced deadliest military clashes in recent months. Still, the ceasefire between the two neighbours is not fully implemented as both sides often accuse one another for cross border violation.
There are several reasons which brought Afghan Taliban for Table Talks with Pakistan; that recently concluded in Urumqi, China. Despite threats from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of significant attacks in support of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan after Pakistan’s military operations, the anticipated violence has not occurred. In fact, TTP assaults within Pakistan have decreased in recent weeks. Thus, Afghanistan is not expecting TTP anymore; to make any impact in Pakistan in terms of insurgency. This tightens Afghanistan’s options of confronting militarily against Pakistan as it is already far behind from Pakistan in terms of conventional military capabilities.
The second significant point behind Afghan Taliban willingness of peace talks is its economic limitations. The Afghanistan’s economic dependency on Pakistan is extremely significant. Before the recent clashes, Afghanistan relied on Pakistan for 70 to 80 percent of its trade. Currently, the trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan are closed and Afghanistan wants to find alternate route. However, Iran war in neighbourhood and limitations in trade with central Asian States such as, insecurity, infrastructure gaps and lack of international banking are some serious hurdles; Afghan Taliban faces. In this regard, Afghan Taliban has reiterated it several times that, it’s govt wants written assurance from Pakistan in terms of trade. This means Afghanistan is highly dependent on Pakistan for its trade and wants long term smooth Trade once its issues are resolved.
More importantly, as a state, the Taliban have very limited options to counter Pakistan’s advanced air and ground military capabilities. If they do not resolve issues through dialogue with Pakistan, they risk losing legitimacy among their people. They are already unpopular in non-Pashtun ethnicities. To make it worst, the country is also internationally isolated and cannot afford internal chaos. Apart from Russia, no other state has formally recognized it yet. Similarly, UN’ sanctions, Economic restrictions and lack of diplomatic recognition are some important limitations which don’t allow Afghan Taliban to prolong its confrontation with Pakistan.
These are some of the significant factors that contribute in bringing Taliban led Afghanistan to the table talks with Pakistan. In this regard, China’s role as a mediator between the two neighbours is momentous.
China typically only engages in negotiations when it expects tangible outcomes. The Urumqi talks are likely to be more successful than previous efforts by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia for a few key reasons. Beijing’s geographic proximity to both Pakistan and Afghanistan, combined with its significant global and regional influence as a major power, places it in a stronger mediating position.
Economically, China is in a strong position to provide financial support to the Taliban if they strike a deal with Pakistan. At the Sixth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue in Kabul on August 20, 2025, Beijing and Islamabad announced the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. This meeting, attended by Foreign Ministers Ishaq Dar from Pakistan, Wang Yi from China, and Amir Khan Muttaqi from Afghanistan, aimed to enhance trade and development by better connecting Afghanistan to regional markets. This shows economic leverage of China over both countries particularly on Afghanistan.
Security issues don’t only impact Pakistan. In recent years, former TTP affiliates have killed more Chinese nationals in single attacks than Baloch armed separatists have managed over years of operations in Baluchistan and Sindh. A notable incident occurred in July 2021, when an attack in Dasu, Kohistan, claimed the lives of nine Chinese engineers working on the Dasu Dam project. In March 2024, a suicide bombing in Besham, Shangla, resulted in the deaths of at least five Chinese citizens. Furthermore, a car bomb exploded at the Quetta Serena Hotel in April 2021, targeting the Chinese ambassador, who was fortunately not on-site at the time. The TTP took responsibility, asserting that it aimed at Pakistani officials without realizing the ambassador’s presence.
Beijing recognizes the critical importance of fostering peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the stakes are too high for prolonged inaction. Baloch militant groups and TTP factions now threaten Chinese interests as severely as traditional adversaries like the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). While the outcome of the Urumqi negotiations is yet to come, the alignment of Chinese strategic interests, economic influence, and both parties’ willingness to de-escalate creates a more favourable environment for progress than previous mediation attempts.
The author is a researcher, columnist, and the founder of Political Frontline. He holds a master degree in International Relations and has a wide experience of writing in various news forums on issues related to diplomacy, Militancy, conflict and political economy. He tweets on @BarkatViews2.